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ATTORNEY'S LIABILITY: THE SECURITIES BAR AND THE
IMPACT OF NATIONAL STUDENT MARKETING
ROBERT C. KocH*
On April 19, 1965, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed a
complaint against Texas Gulf Sulphur and certain of its officers and
employees alleging violations of the antifraud provisions of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act in connection with activities surrounding the Tim-
mons, Ontario, ore strike.' Subsequently, the court in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co.2 held that anyone in possession of material inside inforrna-
tion-regardless of whether he is a director or management officer-must
disclose such information or refrain from trading during the period of
non-disclosure. The court also held that the now-classic press release
indicating caution about the magnitude of the strike would subject the
corporation itself to liability if it were found on remand to be mislead-
ing.3 Litigation of private damage suits arising from Texas Gulf has
terminated in settlement only within the last year. 4
Although Texas Gulf prompted commentary from the outset,5 the
securities bar discovered on March 29, 1968, that they had overlooked
a less obvious but equally treacherous problem, and the position of the
securities lawyer suddenly became more complicated. On that date,
Judge Edward C. McLean of the Southern District of New York de-
nied a motion for summary judgment by the defendants in Esoott v.
* B.S., Illinois Institute of Technology; J.D., College of William & Mary. Associate,
Bell, Boyd, Lloyd, Haddad & Burns, Chicago, Illinois.
1. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., Civil No. 65-1182 (SD.N.Y., filed April 19,
1965). The complaint is summarized at [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP. 93,284, and analyzed at greater depth in Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corpo-
rate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceedings,
51 VA. L. REv. 1271, 1272-74 (1965).
2. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Coats v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969),
aff'g in part and rev'g in part 258 F. Supp. 262 (SD.N.Y. 1969).
3. Citations to the widespread commentary this case received are collected by Kennedy
& Wander, Texas Gulf Sulphur, A Most Unusual Case, 20 Bus. LAw. 1057 (1965). See
also Fleischer, supra note 1, at 1272 n.2.
4. Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fm. SEC. L.
REP. 93,432 (SD.N.Y. April 11, 1972). Of interest to all practitioners is the fact that
attorneys fees expressly were reserved for consideration at future hearings. Id. 93,432,
at 92,153.
5. See notes 1 & 3 supra.
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BarChris Construction Corp.6 Finding widespread material misstate-
ments in connection with a registration of BarChris debentures, the
court held that the directors, underwriters, and auditors had failed to
sustain the defense of due diligence outlined in section 11 of the Se-
curities Act of 193 3.7 Decided in the midst of a robust bull market when
scores of untested companies were seeking to go public, BarChris pro-
duced even greater repercussions than Texas Gulf.8
BarClhris received more attention because the court found an absence
of "due diligence" in practices which deviated in small degree, if at all,
from traditions prevalent within the industry. The word "lawyer" ap-
peared frequently enough in the court's catalog of misdeeds to cause
apprehension among members of the securities bar." Although the
opinion stated that "[n]either the lawyer for the company nor the
lawyer for the underwriters is an expert within the meaning of section
11," '0 BarCtris has been cited for the proposition that a lawyer who
accepts a directorship may be required to meet a higher burden of in-
quiry than a lay director."-
6. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
7. 15 U.S.C. S 77(k) (1964). No appeal from Judge McLean's decision was taken. It
is quite possible that the defendants elected not to appeal for fear that the plaintiffs
would win the right to notify other debenture holders who were not parties to the
district court proceeding. Although Judge McLean denied the motion, he did so
without compelling precedent in the Second Circuit and in spite of decisions such
as Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961), which
would have allowed the notice to be sent. The financial risk inherent in having all
claims or debenture holders before the court could have prompted the settlement.
8. An example of the reaction to BarChris was the A.B.A. National Institute, The
BarChris Case: Prospectus Liability, 24 Bus. LAw. 523 (1969). At the Institute, 29 dis-
tinguished panelists considered the case and its ramifications before an overflow crowd
of approximately 1,000. The proceedings were video-taped; these tapes were later made
available for group showings by the A.B.A. Division of Legal Practice and Education.
9. One of the defendant directors was a young lawyer who had served as house
counsel to BarChris. Judge McLean offered him the wisdom of hindsight in a still-
cryptic sentence: "As a lawyer, he should have known his obligations under the statute."
283 F. Supp. at 687. Another defendant was a partner in the law firm which advised
BarChris on securities matters. Again Judge McLean commented: "It is claimed that a
la yer is entitled to rely on the statements of his clients and that to require him to verify
their accuracy would set an unreasonably high standard. This is too broad a generali-
zation. It is all a matter of degree." Id. at 690. The underwriters were subjected to
liability because their attorney failed to make an adequate in-depth review of the
company's operations and finances. Id. at 692-97.
10. 283 F. Supp. at 683.
11. See, e.g., Loss, The Opinion, 24 Bus. LAw. 527, 529 (1969): "I find it hard to
quarrel with the holding that, so far as the non-expertised portion of the registration
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It is clear that BarChris itself disclaimed any intention to impose spe-
cific section 11 liability on lawyers qua lawyers; accordingly, two com-
mentators'- discussing the possible ramifications of BarChris on the se-
curities bar premised their remarks on the proposition that lawyers, as
lawyers, were immune from section 11 liability. The authors indicated
that lawyers' liability in the securities area would arise in malpractice
actions, if at all. One stated flatly: "The law, so far, is very clear. The
lawyers' responsibility is exclusively to their own client." " The same
author concluded that BarChris was an unusual case demanding special
care because the issuing corporation was involved in a "fad industry." 14
The other commentator suggested the need for malpractice insurance
coverage and a more thorough acquaintance with securities law stand-
ards.'i If these conclusions seem somewhat less than helpful, it may be
that the prospect of broad liability for attorneys involved in allegedly
fraudulent securities transactions was totally foreign to the commen-
tators.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has now demonstrated that
it operates under no such disability. The Commission has taken the
position that the attorney practicing in the securities field owes respon-
sibility not only to his client, but to the investing public as well.16 In
its first major attempt 17 to implement this position, the Commission has
targeted two prominent law firms: The complaint in SEC v. National
Student Marketing Corp.s charges the New York law firm of White
and Case and the Chicago firm of Lord, Bissell and Brook, and partners
statement is concerned, the director who is a lawyer and who did most of the work
on the registration statement has a somewhat greater burden by way of establishing
his defense than the other directors."
12. Freeman, Liability of Counsel for Issuer, 24 Bus. LAw. 635 (1969); Henkel,
Liability of Counsel for Underwriter, 24 Bus. LAw. 641 (1969).
13. Freeman, supra note 12, at 639.
14. Id. at 640.
15. Henkel, supra note 12, at 655.
16. This doctrine can be traced back at least to May, 1967, when an attorney was
named in injunctive proceedings alleging violations of the antifraud provisions. SEC
v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
17. An earlier action charging an attorney with violations of the antifraud provisions
is SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968). See also SEC v. Fields, Civil No. 71-5416
(S.D.N.Y., filed Dec. 13, 1971), charging an attorney who issued 65 opinion letters
purporting to free hundreds of thousands of shares of unregistered stock of four
corporations, with violations of the registration and antifraud provisions. The Fields
case is noted in 132 BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. A-8 (Dec. 22, 1971).
18. Civil No. 72-225 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 2, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Complaint].
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of each, among others, with violations of the antifraud provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.11
In general terms, the complaint alleges an ongoing scheme of fraudu-
lent conduct by the corporation and its officers, directors, and auditors
dating from August, 1968.20 It specifically alleges that misleading state-
ments appeared in the 1968 annual report,2' 1968 10-K report,' 1969
interim financial reports,s 1969 annual report,24 1969 10-K report,'
and 1970 10-K report.20 The alleged misconduct of the law firms de-
rives from their participation in the merger of Interstate National Corpo-
ration into National Student Marketing. 7
The National Student Marketing complaint forces a court for the first
time to balance the attorney-client relationship, its privileges and fi-
duciary obligations on the one hand, with the pervasive regulatory
scheme adopted "for the protection of investors" 28 on the other. The
Commission argues that by extending the principles of BarChris and
Texas Gulf, the balance must b-e struck in favor of the investing public.
19. A consent decree to an injunction against National Student Marketing, its of-
ficers, agents, employees, and subsidiaries from future violations of the antifraud, proxy,
and reporting requirements of securities law has been approved by the United States
District Court, District of Columbia. SEC v. National Student Mkting. Corp., [1971-
1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FEi. SEC. L. REP. 93,581 (D.D.C. July 26, 1972). In
April, 1972, White and Case moved for a change of venue to New York. In May the
attorneys moved for summary judgment. In March, 1973, the district court upheld
venue against White and Case in the District of Columbia and denied the motion for
summary judgment. SEC v. National Student Mkting. Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fv_. SEC. L. REP. t 93,820 (D.D.C. March 21, 1973). For a chronicle of the rise
and fall of National Student Marketing by one of its former vice-presidents see A.
TOBIAS, THE Fu NY MoNEY GAME (1971).
20. Complaint, supra note 18, T 27.
21. Id. 1 28.
22. Id. 29.
23. Id. f4 30-32.
24. Id. T 39.
25. Id. 42-43.
26. Id. T 45.
27. Id. $T 47-52. Further fraudulent conduct is alleged on the part of White &
Case and Robert A. Katz, an attorney for Compujob, Inc. The Compujob claim is
directed at certain opinion letters issued by Katz and White & Case wherein the Com-
mission alleges that they were false in that a merger not yet consummated was repre-
sented as closed and that the defendant attorneys knew or should have known of the
inaccuracies. Id. %4 53-60. The complaint is closely analogous to SEC v. Fields, Civil
No. 71-5416 (S.D.N.Y., filed Dec. 13, 1971) in that it alleges active fraudulent mis-
conduct. The passive misconduct alleged in connection with the interstate merger
has been the subject of the most controversy and will be the primary focus of this
Article.
28. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (b) (1964).
ATTORNEY'S LIABILITY
A decision in favor of the Commission could result in substantial loss
to the law firms involved.2 9
The debacle of National Student Marketing has proved disastrous
to innocent investors already."0 It is the thesis of this Article that the
SEC attempt to hold the attorneys liable, if the factual allegations are
proven, is justified. The standard of care proposed by the Commission
is no higher than the standard of community responsibility already im-
posed by the Canons of Ethics. Furthermore, the fact that the complaint
has been brought, and that it has aroused such an uproar, suggests that
the ramifications of cases like Texas Gulf and BarChris have yet to be
understood fully by the securities bar.
SEC ALLEGATIONS OF WRONGDOING-THE APPLICABILITY OF THE
ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS
As previously indicated, the Commission has alleged fraudulent con-
duct by the attorneys in connection with the merger of Interstate Na-
tional Corporation into National Student Marketing. The Commission
contends that the proxy statement solicited to acquire shareholder ap-
proval for the proposed merger was materially false and misleading in
that, among other errors, it claimed $1,900,000 in earnings for "con-
tracts in progress" when many of these contracts were not in fact
client commitments.31 As a condition to consummation of the merger,
the parties were to receive a comfort letter from the independent audi-
tors, assuring them that the auditors had no reason to believe that the
unaudited financial statement which accompanied the proxy materials
failed in any material way to reflect accurately National Student
Marketing's operations.32
The Commission charges, however, that the comfort letter did not
satisfy this condition. According to the complaint, the letter indicated
various adjustments which should have been made and which, if made,
would have reflected a net loss rather than net earnings of $700,000 for
the period in question.3 The complaint further alleges that the at-
29. See notes 69-82 infra & accompanying text.
30. Initially offered at $6.00 per share in April 1968, National Student Marketing
rose to a high of $144.00 per share on December 15, 1969. Recently, the stock was
quoted at 2 bid, 2 Y2 asked.
31. Complaint, supra note 18, 33. This conduct, if proven, contravenes the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, § 14a, 15 U.S.C. § 78(n) (1964) and Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-9 (1972).
32. Complaint, supra note 18, 49.
33. Id.
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torneys knew the contents of the comfort letter prior to the merger,
and nevertheless permitted consummation without disclosing the con-
tents of the letter to public investors and shareholders of National Stu-
dent Marketing and Interstate.34 Contemporaneous with the receipt of
the comfort letter, it is alleged that White and Case, representing Na-
tional Student Marketing, and Lord, Bissell and Brook, representing
Interstate, issued opinion letters stating that all steps required to con-
summate the merger had been taken and that their respective clients had
violated no law to the knowledge of counsel.' 5
Before a further examination of attorneys' liability can be conducted,
it is appropriate to discuss recent cases concerning questions of whether
a merger constitutes a sale of securities and whether privity is a required
basis to find the attorneys liable. Where it is alleged that directors of
both companies and the auditors were equally culpable in failing to
disclose the contents of the letter, 6 it seems clear under prior case law
that the antifraud provisions will apply to the transaction involved.
A "sale" of securities is a necessary jurisdictional element to any suit for
violations of the antifraud provisions of the securities actsY." Whether
the merger situation constitutes a purchase or sale has been debated
34. Id. 1 48(a).
35. Id. t 48(d)-(e).
36. Id. 48(a),-(f),-(g),-(h),-(k).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 77(q) (1964) provides in pertinent part: "(a) It shall be unlawful
for any person in the offer or sale of any securities. . . to engage in any transaction,
practice, or course of business which would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the
purchaser." (emphasis supplied). 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1964) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange . . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in con-
travention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
(emphasis supplied).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1967) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange . . .
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection
with the purchase and sale of any security.
(emphasis supplied).
[Vol. 14:883
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throughout the history of the Securities Acts.3" Although the legislative
history of the 1933 Act indicates that a merger was regarded as a sale
which would require a registration statement, 39 the Commission's posi-
tion has shifted over the years.40
Authority that a merger does involve a sale for the purposes of the
antifraud provisions is found in Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co.41 and
Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp.42 Speaking for the court, Judge Schnacken-
berg stated in Dasho:
The argument that the transformation of rights occurring upon
statutory merger is a distinct corporate phenomenon which does
not involve purchase and sale of securities has some appeal, but in
view of the objectives of the securities and the exchange acts, it
seems to me better to recognize, for the purpose of the antifraud
provisions, that sales and purchases are involved. This view does no
violence to the statutory language, and is the present interpretation
of the body which is responsible for the administration of the
acts.
43
The Supreme Court first addressed the question in SEC v. National
Securities, Inc.44 The complaint in National Securities closely parallels
that in National Student Marketing, in that both allege fraudulent mis-
statements in proxy materials solicited to acquire shareholder approval
for a merger.
38. See generally L. Loss, SEcuRITIEs REGULATION 518-39 (2d ed. 1961).
39. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1933).
40. Note to Rule 5 of Form E-1, adopted 1935. The Commission in National Supply
Co. v. Stanford Univ., 134 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 773 (1943),
filed an amicus brief contending that a merger was not a sale for purpose of civil
liability. With the adoption of Rule 133 under the 1933 Act the Commission retraced
its steps, however, and indicated that the "No-Sale" doctrine applied only in matters
pertaining to registration. Rule 133 has since been repealed. Effective January 1,
1973, Rule 145, 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1973) states definitely that for purpose of the
antifraud provisions, a merger does constitute a "sale.'
41. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Vine, 389
U.S. 970 (1967).
42. 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Bard v. Dasho, 389 U.S. 977
(1967).
43. 380 F.2d at 269. But see 9 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 510 (1968), wherein the
student author complained that "[Sluch a method of dealing with this important
securities law issue is an unsatisfactory method of developing a stable body of law."
Id. at 520.
44. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
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Although the Court in National Securities was concerned primarily
with the breadth of the McCarren-Ferguson Act,4 5 in holding that the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws did in fact apply to the transac-
tion, the question whether a merger involved a purchase or sale neces-
sarily was answered in the affirmative:
Whatever the terms "purchase" and "sale" may mean in other con-
texts, here an alleged deception has affected individual share-
holders' decisions in ways not at all unlike that involved in a typical
cash sale or share exchange. The broad antifraud purposes of the
statute and rule would clearly be furthered by their application
to this type of situation. Therefore we conclude that Producers
Life's shareholders "purchased" shares in the new company by ex-
changing them for their old stock.46
The Court also dismissed the contention that the antifraud provisions
were inapplicable to misstatements in proxy solicitations:
Section 10(b) applies to all proscribed conduct in connection with
a purchase or sale of any security; § 14 applies to all proxy solici-
tations, whether or not in connection with a purchase or sale. The
fact that there may well be some overlap is neither unusual nor
unfortunate.... Accordingly, we find no bar to the application
of Rule lob-5 to respondents' misstatements in their proxy ma-
terials.47
In the light of these decisions, it seems clear that the antifraud provisions
are applicable to the alleged misconduct in connection with the National
Student Marketing-Interstate merger.48
The complaint, it should be noted, does not allege that the attorneys
entered the market either to buy or sell shares of either of the two com-
panies.49 However, they were privy to "inside information" because of
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1964).
46. 393 U.S. at 467.
47. Id. at 469-69.
48. Transactions after January 1, 1973, are controlled by Rule 145, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.145(a) (2) (1973), which states that for purposes of the 1933 Act any merger
in which securities are exchanged shall be deemed to involve a "sale" within the meaning
of section 2(3) of the Act.
49. The third claim of the Complaint alleges that, after receipt of the comfort letter,
White & Case requested, and Lord, Bissel & Brook issued, an opinion letter stating
that former Interstate shareholders were free to sell National Student Marketing shares
acquired in the merger. The opinion letter, according to the Commission, failed to
[Vol. 14:883
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their relation to the merger transaction. The first pronouncement of the
SEC concerning insider disclosure is found in In the Matter of Cady,
Roberts & Co.: 5 "[I] nsiders must disclose material facts which are
known to them by v'irtue of their position but which are not known to
persons with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their
investment judgment. Failure to make disclosure under these circum-
stances constitutes a violation of the antifraud provisions." "' The Com-
mission defined the term "insider" broadly;5 2 thus, anyone who acquires
inside information, even one with no continuing relationship to the com-
pany, may be held liable for failure to disclose.53
The language of Cady, Roberts suggests the necessity of privity to
state a cause of action. Nevertheless, when read with Texas Gulf, it
appears that a stock market transaction by the defendant is not necessary
to satisfy at least section 10(b):
disclose the contents of the comfort letter or the alleged need for readjustment of the
interim financials. The Commission alleges that approximately 77,000 shares of Na-
tional Student Marketing valued at $1,900,000 were sold on the basis of this opinion.
Complaint, supra note 18, 49-52. The textual analysis is limited, however, to the
attorneys' alleged failure to halt the merger until full disclosure of the comfort letter
could be achieved.
50. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
51. Id. at 911.
52. [T~he anti-fraud provisions are phrased in terms of "any person" and that
a special obligation has been traditionally required of corporate insiders, e.g.
officers, directors, and controlling stockholders. These three groups, how-
ever do not exhaust the classes of persons upon whom there is such an
obligation. Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements:
first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly,
to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and
not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness
involved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing. In considering these ele-
ments under the broad language of the anti-fraud provisions we are not
to be circumscribed by fine distinctions and rigid classifications. Thus
our task here is to identify those persons who are in a special relationship
with a company and privy to its internal affairs, and thereby suffer cor-
relative duties in trading in its securities. Intimacy demands restraint lest
the uninformed be exploited.
Id. at 912.
53. Accord, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). See also
Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), where the defendant independent
auditor sought to dismiss a private 10b-5 damage action predicated on allegations that
required reports prepared by the auditors contained false statements, that the auditors
subsequently discovered the errors and failed to disclose the newfound information.
The court refused to dismiss the complaint.
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[I]t seems clear from the legislative purpose Congress expressed
in the Act, and the legislative history of Section 10(b), that
Congress when it used the phrase "in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security" intended only that the device employed,
whatever it might be, be of a sort that would cause reasonable
investors to rely thereon, and, in connection therewith, so rely-
ing, cause them to purchase or sell a corporation's securities. There
is no indication that Congress intended that the corporations or
persons responsible for the issuance of a misleading statement
would not violate the section unless they engaged in related se-
curities transactions or otherwise acted with wrongful motives;
indeed, the obvious purposes of the Act to protect the investing
public and to secure fair dealing in the securities markets would be
seriously undermined by applying such a gloss onto the legislative
language.54
Therefore, it appears that a sale of securities did take place in the
merger of Interstate National into National Student Marketing, and that
it was not necessary that attorneys actually have engaged in market
transactions to be subject to rule lob-5. In light of the lawyers' alleged
failure to disclose material inside information, the SEC seems to be on
solid ground in issuing the complaint. Whether the attorneys should
be liable in this situation is a more difficult question.
PRIVILEGE v. DIscLosU1RE: THE ROLE OF THE SEC PRACTITIONER
The complaint in National Student Marketing has upset members of
the securities bar who view it both as a threat to the confidential nature
of attorney-client privilege and an attempt to place the attorney in a
quasi-adversary position vis-a-vis his own client. These practitioners
argue that any attempt to invade the confidential relationship may result
in even less disclosure, as clients might withhold potentially damaging
information from their securities counsel.55 The Commission finds this
reasoning specious. One SEC official commented that: "The securities
bar is getting to be like the tax bar; it's specializing in finding loopholes
in the law." 56 Former SEC chairman William L. Cary was unequivocal
in his support for the Commission's action in National Student Market-
54. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968).
55. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 15, 1972, at 17, col. 3.
56. Id. col. 4.
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ing. He said, "It will set higher standards for lawyers in handling their
clients' financial matters." 57
If prior case law is an accurate guide to the probable disposition in
National Student Marketing, it seems likely that the Commission's posi-
tion, rather than the practitioners', will be upheld. As early as 1964,
the Second Circuit, affirming the convictions of an auditor and an attor-
ney for conspiracy and mail fraud in connection with a sale of un-
registered securities,58 stated: "In our complex society the accountant's
certificate and the lawyer's opinion can be instruments for inflicting
pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the crowbar." n1 More
recently, the SEC obtained an injunction against an attorney who had
drafted an allegedly misleading offering circular.60 Although the is-
suance of a temporary injunction by the district court was reversed
because of procedural defects, the Second Circuit did explain circum-
stances which would give rise to injunctive relief:
Although Frank makes much of this being the first instance in
which the Commission has obtained an injunction against an at-
torney for participation in the preparation of an allegedly mis-
leading offering circular or prospectus, we find this unimpres-
sive.... A lawyer has no privilege to assist in circulating a state-
ment with regard to securities which he knows to be false simply
because his client has furnished it to him. At the other extreme
it would be unreasonable to hold a lawyer who was putting his
client's description of a chemical process into understandable
English to be guilty of fraud simply because of his failure to detect
discrepancies between their description and technical reports
available to him in a physical sense but beyond his ability to un-
derstand. The instant case lies between these extremes. The SEC's
position is that Frank had been furnished with information which
even a non-expert would recognize as showing the falsity of
many of the representations. . . . If this is so, the Commission
would be entitled to prevail; a lawyer, no more than others, can
escape liability for fraud by closing his eyes to what he saw and
could readily understand.61
57. NEwswEEK, March 6, 1972, at 61.
58. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964).
59. Id. at 863.
60. SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1969).
61. Id. at 488-89.
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If the Commission in National Student Marketing proves the facts al-
leged, the court may well conclude that the attorneys were aware of the
discrepancies in the proxy materials and did in fact "close their eyes."
For this type of conduct the injunction must issue. The cornerstone of
securities regulation is disclosure, and the securities attorney, as an expert
in law, is in the best position to insure that the law commanding dis-
closure is obeyed.
The Commission appears to be on sound ground, not only in bringing
to task the conduct of the National Student Marketing attorneys, but also
in seeking to establish procedures to be followed by the attorney who
learns that his client's statements may be misleading. The complaint
recites that the attorneys should have either insisted that the financial
statements be revised and shareholders resolicited, or ceased represent-
ing the two companies and notified the Commission of the alleged mis-
leading nature of the statements.62 It is this duty of disclosure which
has caused the greatest consternation, 3 even though the Commission's
proposed standard of conduct comports with the American Bar Asso-
ciation's Code of Professional Responsibility."4
The ABA Code recites:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpe-
trated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly
call upon his client to rectify the same, and if the client
refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the
affected person or tribunal. 65
62. Complaint, supra note 18, 1 48(i).
63. See Summary, 138 BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. 1 (Feb. 9, 1972).
64. A contrary view has been advanced; although the Canons specify the need for
candor, they also require confidentiality. Analogous cases usually balance these com-
peting needs in favor of maintaining a client's confidences. Moreover, those cases
which find accountants liable can be distinguished from cases such as National Student
Marketing Corp., insofar as attorney's liability is concerned, on several grounds. These
grounds include the following: First, the securities law does not recognize an ac-
countant-client privilege. Second, an attorney acts as an agent for a client while ani
accountant acts independently to certify material facts. Third, an attorney is not a
section 11(a) "expert," but an accountant is. Karmel, Attorneys' Securities Laws
Liabilities, 27 Bus. LAw. 1153, 1160-63 (1972).
65. ABA CODE OF PRoFEssIoNAL REsPoNSIBILrY, DIsCIPLINARY RuLp 7-102 (B) (1) (1969)
(emphasis supplied).
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As a Disciplinary Rule, this ABA standard is a mandatory requirement
of the minimum acceptable level of conduct and is "uniformly applied
to all lawyers, regardless of the nature of their professional activities." Il
Some might argue that the rule applies only to information from in-
dependent sources and not to information obtained within the scope of
the attorney-client privilege. However, this position does not comply
with the Code, which provides that: "A lawyer may reveal... [c] on-
fidences or secrets7 when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or re-
quired by law or court order." 68 Thus, an attorney is permitted by the
ABA Code to reveal privileged information indicating misconduct by
his client, and when the information "clearly" indicates fraud there is
nothing in the standard of conduct proposed by the SEC in National
Student Marketing which constitutes a departure from the ABA Code.
SOME CONSEQUENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS
In its prayer for relief, the Commission seeks to enjoin permanently
the law firms and auditors, the named partners, "their agents, servants,
employees, successors, assignees and those persons in active concert or
participation with them, from, directly or indirectly" violating any of
the provisions of rule IOb-5, from filing false and misleading reports with
the SEC, and from disseminating proxy materials in contravention of
section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.69 This prayer,
practitioners have argued, places the defendant law firms on the horns of
a most difficult dilemma. First, they can defend the suit, raising the at-
tendant publicity, in an effort to be vindicated; however, if the factual
allegations are proven, judgment for the Commission seems warranted.
An alternative approach would be to enter a consent decree to the in-
junction. 0 The lawyers in National Student Marketing, should they
enter a consent decree, would avoid the publicity and expense of a
66. Id. at PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.
67. "Confidence" is defined by the Code as including all information protected by
the attorney-client privilege. "Secret" is a broader term meaning all information ac-
quired in the professional relationship which the client has requested not be released
and which would be embarrassing or detrimental to the client. Id. at 4-101 (A).
68. Id. at 4-101(c) (2).
69. Complaint, supra note 18, prayer for relief, at 44-45.
70. See, e.g., SEC v. Pig'n' Whistle Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. RE'. 1 93,384 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (Issuer and Financial Public Relations Firm). The
consent decree for National Student Marketing Corp. is reported at [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,591 (D.D.C. July 26, 1972).
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lengthy suit, but would be subject to possible sanctions under rule 2 (e)
of the SEC Rules of Practice.71 The provisions of this rule, as it would
apply in this case, are essentially as follows. The Commission, in con-
sideration of the public interest and without a hearing, may suspend
temporarily from SEC practice any attorney or other professional who
has been enjoined by name from further violations of the securities laws. 72
For purposes of the rule, any person who consents to an injunction is
presumed to have been enjoined for misconduct and is also subject to
suspension.7
The temporary suspension would last 30 days, during which time the
suspended party would be entitled to petition the SEC to lift the sus-
pension.7 4 If no petition is filed, the suspension becomes permanent;
once petitioned, however, the Commission would be required either
to lift the temporary suspension or to set the matter for hearing at
which time the petitioner could be censured, suspended for an additional
period, or disqualified permanently.75 After a showing that the in-
junction has issued, the petitioner would have the burden to show cause
why disciplinary measures should not be taken.76
The rule imposes severe sanctions. Nevertheless, three mitigating
factors are worthy of note. First, the decision to invoke any sanction is
discretionary with the Commission, and, therefore, it is by no means cer-
tain that an injunction will trigger a suspension automatically. Second,
even if the disciplinary proceeding is carried to its full length, the
suspended practitioner at any time may apply for reinstatement and,
upon a satisfactory showing, be reinstated."' Finally, the Commission has
exhibited a tendency to tread lightly on penalties when it breaks new
ground in defining violations.7" Since rule 2 (e) has b-een rewritten only
recently, the attorneys, if found culpable, may escape the most severe
sanctions that the Commission might otherwise impose.
A complete 'escape, however, is unlikely. If wrongful activities are
proven, the attorneys might not be barred from SEC practice, but the
71. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e), as amended by Release No. 33-5088 (Sept. 24, 1970) and
Release No. 33-5417 (May 10, 1971).
72. 17 C.F.R. § 201.3(i).
73. Id. § 201.3(iv).
74. Id. § 201.3(i).
75. Id. § 201.3 (iii).
76. Id. § 201.3 (iv).
77. Id. § 201.4.
78. A classic example is In re Ira Haupt & Co., 23 S.E.C. 589 (1946).
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probability of an action for money damages cannot be discounted. At
present, five private damage suits naming the attorneys as defendants
have been reported.79 In this regard, the possibility of class actions
seeking damages for attorneys' misconduct should not be ignored. Con-
siderations of whether any single plaintiff could represent a class of
traders, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
Assuming that a plaintiff does succeed, the law firms would become
liable under the judgment. Efforts by individual defendants to rely on
indemnification agreements to avoid personal liability for violations of
the securities laws have been unsuccessful in at least one instance. In
Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc.,80 an underwriter joined as a de-
fendant in a private fraud action sought indemnity under its agreement
with the issuer. The court denied the benefit of the agreement, since
enforcement would work in derogation of the public policy imposing dis-
closure obligations on all parties to securities transactions."' The only
form of protection, and it is really no protection at, all, is the right of
the defendant who has suffered judgment to contribution from his joined
co-defendants.8 2 From the standpoint of lawyers generally, the con-
tribution right under the securities laws has two principal aspects. First,
for lawyers named as defendants, the right runs only against those bound
by the judgment. Thus, any parties not named as original defendants
who may be liable should be served with third-party complaints to
preserve the contribution right. Second, for lawyers not named, in suits
past and present, the running of the statute of limitations on the original
plaintiff's claim, if any, against the lawyer does not bar the possibility of
claims for contribution on the part of the named defendants. The action
for contribution has its own limitation period, which does not begin to
run until judgment is rendered on the original claim. Admittedly, this
is little solace for the attorney found liable in a securities fraud suit, but
little solace appears justified.
79. See In re National Student Mkting. Litigation, [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEc.
L. REP. 93,743 (Jan. 29, 1973).
80. 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 813 (1970).
81. See State Mut. Life Assurance Co. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 49 F.R D. 202
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), where a similar result was reached in a suit by auditors claiming
implied indemnity against corporate officers.
82. The right to contribution for 10b-5 defendants was first recognized in deHass
v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968). It has been acimowledged
in the Southern District of New York in Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318
F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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CONCLUSION
The alleged conduct of the defendant attorneys in National Student
Marketing appears to be actionable fraud under the securities acts. It
further appears that the alleged misconduct was in violation of the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility and that the Code forms the stand-
ard of conduct which the complaint seeks to establish. One author has
remarked: "The auditors probably figured that if something disrepu-
table was going on, then White and Case would not sit quietly by as
counsel. White and Case was probably reassured by the fact that Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell apparently had no qualms about the financial state-
ments." s It isthe contention of the SEC, however, that passive as well as
active misconduct is actionable under the antifraud provisions.
Any outrage at the institution of this complaint is misplaced. If the
facts alleged are proven, imposition of liability on the lawyers qua
lawyers seems justified. To require the securities bar to protect the
investing public by disclosing the conduct of which they have knowl-
edge imposes no greater duty upon the practitioner than the American
Bar Association's own standards of community responsibility. To im-
pose such a duty, although contrary to accepted industry practice, is a
reasonable means to implement a primary purpose of the securities laws
-protection of the individual investor through full disclosure.
83. A. TOBIAS, supra note 19, at 85.
